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Abstract
Alice has made a decision in her mind. While she does not want to reveal it
to Bob at this moment, she would like to convince Bob that she is committed
to this particular decision and that she cannot change it at a later time.
Is there a way for Alice to get Bob’s trust? Until recently, researchers had
believed that the above task can be performed with the help of quantum
mechanics. And the security of the quantum scheme lies on the uncertainty
principle. Nevertheless, such optimism was recently shattered by Mayers and
by us, who found that Alice can always change her mind if she has a quantum
computer. Here, we survey this dramatic development and its implications
on the security of other quantum cryptographic schemes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography — the art of sending secret messages — has a long and distinguished
history of applications. The security of conventional cryptographic systems is often based
on some computational assumptions such as the hardness of factoring of large composite
numbers [1,2]. Remarkably, in 1994 Shor found an efficient quantum algorithm for factoring
[3,4]. Consequently, much of the conventional cryptography will fall apart, if a quantum
computer is ever built.
Interestingly, it has been proposed that quantum mechanics also comes to the rescue. In
quantum mechanics, there is a well-known “no-cloning theorem” saying that an unknown
quantum state cannot be cloned [5,6]. Consequently, eavesdropping in the quantum world
will, in general, disturb the quantum state one is listening to. Thus, an eavesdropper can be
discovered readily. Bennett and Brassard had shown in 1984 how quantum cryptography can
be used to secure communications between two users against eavesdropping attack through
the so-called quantum key distribution scheme [7]. This article does not concern quantum
key distribution. Instead, we concentrate on a class of more fancy schemes, which are
probably more useful in peacetime. The basic theme in those applications is the protection
of private information during a public decision.
More concretely, in today’s world, sometimes we need to cooperate or negotiate with
other people without trusting them completely. An example is long-distance (e.g. over the
phone) coin flip . Suppose a divorced couple wants to decide who keeps the house by a fair
coin flip. Nevertheless, they no longer trust each other. The problem is, therefore, how this
can be done fairly without having to arrange a meeting or to trust a third party to flip the
coin.
Before addressing the above problem, let us consider a simpler scheme. Suppose Alice
has chosen a number either zero or one. And she wants to give Bob a piece of evidence
that she has made up her mind in such a way that (i) Bob knows nothing about Alice’s
choice at this moment; and (ii) Alice can no longer change her mind without being caught
by Bob when she publicly announces her choice at a later time. This kind of task is called
bit commitment [8].
Clearly, bit commitment can be used to achieve coin tossing. Alice commits to a bit
— zero or one. Then Bob guesses which bit Alice has chosen. Finally, Alice opens her
commitment by telling Bob which bit she has chosen. Bob verifies that Alice has been honest
in executing the scheme. It turns out that bit commitment is a very important primitive in
cryptography [1,9]. As will be discussed in later Sections, the security of conventional bit
commitment usually relies on computational assumptions which can be broken in theory by
exhaustive computer analysis. There had been a widespread belief that quantum schemes can
get rid of computational assumptions, thus solving a long standing problem in cryptography.
The main focus of this review is the surprising result that this widespread belief has
been misplaced. If Alice has a quantum computer, she can make an empty promise to Bob
(i.e., Alice can change her choice at any time before she publicly opens her commitment)
without being caught. This discovery represents a major victory of quantum cryptanalysts
(i.e., code-breakers) over quantum cryptographers (i.e., code-makers). Finally, we remark
that secure data transmission using quantum mechanics through the so-called quantum key
distribution is unaffected by this new discovery.
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II. BIT COMMITMENT — FROM THE ANCIENT TO THE POST-MODERN
WORLD
A. Bit Commitment In The Ancient World
The first bit commitment scheme in history probably goes as follows: First, Alice writes
down her choice on a piece of paper, puts it in a box, and locks it up. She gives the box to
Bob, but keeps the key herself. Later on, she proves her commitment to Bob (which is called
opening her commitment) by sending the key to Bob, who can then open the box and verify
the value of her committed bit. Although this method is simple and straight-forward, there
is a serious loophole. The security of this simple bit commitment scheme relies heavily on
the physical security of the box and the lock. This is clearly not very useful in the electronic
age.
B. Bit Commitment In The Modern World
Modern (non-quantum) bit commitment schemes rely on the idea of a one-way function
— a function that is easy to compute, but very hard to reverse. For instance, multiplying
two integers is easy, but there is no known efficient classical algorithm1 to date for computing
the factors of a large composite number [2].
In the modern world, a bit commitment scheme may go as follows (see Ref. [8] for
discussions of various bit commitment schemes):
[Classical Bit Commitment Scheme]
1. Alice chooses her bit b = 0 to be committed to Bob.
2. If b = 0, she picks a random even number x and computes y = f(x) where f is a
one-way function. Similarly, if b = 1, she picks a random odd number y and computes
y = f(x). She sends y to Bob. This completes the commit phase.
3. To open her commitment, Alice sends x to Bob.
4. Bob verifies that y = f(x) and checks whether x is odd or even. This verifies Alice’s
honesty.
The above bit commitment scheme (as well as all other variations) relies on the assump-
tion that f−1 is hard to compute.2 Consequently, although Bob has received y = f(x) in
Step 3, he cannot invert the function f efficiently enough to get x and hence b in time. In
other words, even though Bob has all the information he needs to compute b (and hence
1That is, an algorithm working on a classical computer.
2Actually, we are making a stronger assumption—that it is computationally infeasible to determine
whether the pre-image of f is even or odd—than the one-way function hypothesis.
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to know Alice’s choice) before she opens her commitment, the hardness to compute f−1
effectively prevents him from doing so.
Nevertheless, no one has proven the existence of a one-way function [10]. Therefore,
the security in this kind of bit commitment scheme is based on computational assumptions,
which can be in principle broken either by exhaustive computer analysis, or by using more
efficient algorithms.
To make the situation even worse, in 1994 Shor discovered an efficient quantum me-
chanical algorithm for factoring composite numbers [3,4,11]. His algorithm makes use of the
quantum interference effect and massive quantum parallelism in quantum mechanics, which
do not have any classical counterpart. Since it is a technological challenge to actually build
a quantum computer, Shor’s result does not threaten classical bit commitment schemes im-
mediately. However, the construction of a quantum computer is not forbidden at all by
the laws of physics. One can envisage one day when quantum computer becomes a reality.
Then, all classical bit commitment schemes will be unsafe.
C. Bit Commitment In The Post-Modern World
Following the pioneering works by Wiesner on “quantum money” and “multiplexing
channel” [12], various quantum bit commitment schemes have been proposed [7,13–15].
There was a common belief just two years ago that quantum bit commitment is absolutely
safe [13,16,17]. That is to say, even if both Alice and Bob have infinite computational power
and can invoke quantum computers, any dishonest party will still be caught. The confidence
on the security of quantum bit commitment is perhaps partly based on the following fact: if
you are given a single unknown quantum state, then there is no way for you to tell exactly
what that quantum state is. This is because measurement on an unknown quantum state is
an irreversible process.
A number of quantum bit commitment schemes have been proposed [7,13–15]. Amongst
them, the most well-known one is probably the BCJL scheme [13]. The detailed procedure
of the BCJL scheme is irrelevant for our discussion. Nonetheless, for completeness, it is
listed below.
[BCJL Quantum Bit Commitment Scheme]
1. Let ǫ be the average noise level of a quantum communication channel shared between
Alice and Bob. Bob chooses a Boolean matrix G as the generating matrix of a binary
linear (n, k, d)-code C such that the ratio d/n > 10ǫ and the ratio k/n = 0.52 and
announces it to Alice.
2. Alice chooses a non-zero random n-bit string r and announces it to Bob.
3. Alice chooses a random n-bit codeword c from C such that the scalar product modulo
two (i.e., the parity of the bitwise logical AND) between c and r is equal to the bit to
which she is committed.
4. Alice picks a random n-bit string b. Suppose the ith bit of b, bi, equals zero. Then she
sends Bob her ith photon in the 0◦ or 90◦ polarization according to whether ci = 0 or
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ci = 1. Similarly, if bi = 1, she sends Bob her ith photon in the 45
◦ or 135◦ polarization
according to whether ci = 0 or ci = 1.
5. Bob chooses a random n-bit string b′. He measures the ith photon that he receives
from Alice in the 0◦ and 90◦ polarization basis if b′i = 0. Otherwise, he measures the
ith photon using the 45◦ and 135◦ polarization basis. In either case, he writes down
the measurement results.
6. To open her commitment, Alice reveals c, b and her committed bit to Bob.
7. Bob verifies that c is a codeword. Also, if both Alice and Bob use the same basis for
transmission and measurement, then their results ci and c
′
i must agree in the absence
of noise. Therefore, Bob verifies that the error rate in these cases is less than the
acceptable value of 1.4ǫ. Finally, Bob checks that the parity of the scalar product
modulo two between r and c is indeed Alice’s committed bit. Bob accepts Alice’s
commitment only if Alice passes all the three tests above.
In spite of its apparent complexity, the essential idea behind the BCJL scheme can be
readily understood. Alice encodes her commitment as some polarization of photons that is
unknown to Bob. Thus, it is impossible for Bob to determine Alice’s choice before she opens
her commitment. Indeed, Brassard et al. [13] have already proven the security of the BCJL
scheme against a cheating Bob. The alleged security of this scheme against a cheating Alice
is, however, flawed. Mayers [18] and, independently, we ourselves [19] showed that Alice
can cheat successfully if she has a quantum computer. As it turns out, the same cheating
strategy can break not only all the existing schemes, but also all quantum bit commitment
schemes [20–22] that one can possibly construct. So, let us tell you what the most general
form of quantum bit commitment scheme is before proving that it is necessarily insecure.
III. INSECURITY OF QUANTUM BIT COMMITMENT
A. General Form Of A Quantum Bit Commitment Scheme
As will be argued in Subsection IIIC below, when appropriately formulated, the most
general form of a quantum bit commitment scheme goes as follows [18–23]:
[General Quantum Bit Commitment Scheme]
1. Alice and Bob both initialize the quantum particles at their hands to a prescribed
state.
2. Alice applies a unitary transformation to the quantum particles at her hand according
to the value of her committed bit. Then she sends some of her quantum particles to
Bob.
3. After receiving the quantum particles from Alice, Bob applies a unitary transformation
to the quantum particles at his hand. He then sends some of his quantum particles to
Alice.
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4. Steps 2 and 3 are repeated finite number of times.
5. To open her commitment, Alice sends all her particles to Bob.
6. After receiving Alice’s particles, Bob measures the composite system to verify Alice’s
honesty.
B. Unitary Description
Let us formulate the above description in mathematics.3 Our justifications that the
scheme is general will be made in Subsection IIIC. Let us denote the Hilbert spaces of
Alice’s and Bob’s quantum machines by HA and HB, respectively. And the Hilbert space
of the quantum communication channel is denoted by HC . A quantum bit commitment
scheme is executed in H = HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HC. Initially, Alice prepares a state |0〉A or |1〉A
according to the value that she would like to be committed to Bob. Bob prepares a fixed
state |v〉B for HB⊗HC . This is Step 1 of the general scheme. Consequently, the initial state
is |ub〉 = |b〉A⊗|v〉B when Alice is committed to b (b = 0, 1). The two parties now take turns
to perform unitary transformations (Steps 2–4). That is, in each step, a party D ∈ {A,B}
applies a unitary transformation on the system HD ⊗ HC . Such a unitary transformation
induces a unitary transformation on the larger space H .
The upshot is that the whole procedure of the commit phase, being a sequence of unitary
transformations on H , can be summarized by a single unitary transformation U applied to
the initial state on H . Such a unitary description will greatly simplify our discussion: At
the end of the commit phase, Alice and Bob share a pure state, either U (|0〉A ⊗ |v〉B) or
U (|1〉A ⊗ |v〉B). Also, since Alice and Bob know the procedure of the protocol, they also
know U . So, once Alice opens her commitment by sending all her particles to Bob (Step 5),
Bob can readily verify Alice’s claim (Step 6).
Here we assume the most advantageous situation for Bob where during the opening
phase Alice sends all her particles to Bob. We shall show that even then Alice can cheat
successfully.
C. Generality Of The Above Description
Let us explain why the BCJL protocol falls into the above general scheme. Clearly, except
for the selection of the error correcting code in Step 1, the BCJL protocol involves only one
way communications from Alice to Bob. Also, sending photons with different polarization
to Bob in Step 4 of the BCJL scheme is equivalent to first applying a unitary transformation
to the initialized photons by Alice before sending them to Bob. Moreover, it does no harm
for Bob to delay his measurement in Step 5 of BCJL until Alice opens her commitment.
At this point, readers may question if the above commitment scheme is the most general
one. In particular, they may raise the following objections:
3Mayers proved that all quantum bit commitment schemes are insecure in Refs. [20,21]. Here we
will, however, follow our discussion of the same result in Refs. [22].
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Question 1: Communications by classical means between Alice and Bob is not considered.
Answer 1: Since classical communications are a special case of quantum communications,
they can be done on a quantum channel and there is no need to give them any
special consideration.
Question 2: Alice and Bob may measure some of their quantum particles in Steps 2– 4.
Moreover, the unitary transformations they apply may depend on the results of
their measurements. More importantly, measurements give rise to decoherence.
Wouldn’t a bit commitment scheme with some measurements be secure?
Answer 2: Alice and Bob can delay their measurements until the opening of the commit-
ment. For example, given a bit commitment scheme that involves a measure-
ment by Alice and that Alice is supposed to apply a unitary transformation Ui
to the rest of her quantum particles if her measurement result is |ei〉 for some i.
She can define another linear operator U which maps |ei〉 ⊗ |Ψ〉 to |ei〉 ⊗ Ui|Ψ〉
for each i. Clearly, U is a unitary operator. Therefore, Alice may choose to
apply U to her quantum particles and delay her measurement until the opening
phase.
Even bit commitment schemes with measurements are insecure. The key insight
is the following: To show that all bit commitment schemes (classical, quantum
or quantum but with some measurements) are insecure, it suffices to consider
only a general fully quantum bit commitment scheme where both Alice and Bob
have quantum computers. This is because any other procedure followed by Bob
in a bit commitment scheme can be rephrased as a quantum bit commitment
scheme where Bob does have a quantum computer but just fails to make full
use of it.
Now, we will show that Alice has a winning strategy against Bob even if he
makes full use of his quantum computer. It is then clear that this “sure-win”
strategy by Alice will defeat a Bob who fails to make full use of his quantum
computer. Therefore, the insecurity of a fully quantum bit commitment scheme
automatically implies the insecurity of all bit commitment schemes (purely
quantum, classical or quantum scheme but with measurements).
Notice also that a cheating Alice generally needs a quantum computer to cheat.
Question 3: Alice and Bob may throw dice to decide which unitary transformation to use.
Moreover, they may invoke ancillary quantum particles. More generally, Alice
and Bob are dealing with density matrices, not wavefunctions.
Answer 3: Using the same argument in Answer 2, Alice and Bob can delay the throwing
of the die (i.e., the state of the die is kept in a quantum superposition and
does not collapse) until the opening phase. Any ancilla (including the quantum
die) can be incorporated into Alice and Bob’s quantum machines right at the
beginning. This simply leads to an extension of the dimensions of the Hilbert
spaces HA ⊗HB. Moreover, the state in the tensor product of these extended
Hilbert spaces is pure.
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Question 4: Instead of manipulating the quantum particles in turn, Alice and Bob may
manipulate, send out, and receive their quantum particles in parallel. That is
to say, Steps 2 and 3 are space-like events.
Answer 4: In practice, it is impossible to ensure that Alice and Bob receive signals simul-
taneously. This is because, for two distant observers, there is no way for one to
be sure of the physical location of the other. (Recall that one of the two persons
may be cheating.) More importantly, simultaneity has no invariant meaning in
special relativity.
Having convinced ourselves that the above bit commitment scheme is the most general one,
we turn to Alice’s cheating strategy. First, we need a technical result.
D. Schmidt Decomposition4
Let HA and HB be Hilbert spaces with dimensions p and q, respectively. And let |Φ〉
be any normalized state in HA ⊗ HB. Define the density matrix ρ = |Φ〉〈Φ|, and reduced
density matrices ρA = TrBρ and ρ
B = TrAρ.
Claim: |Φ〉 can be written as
|Φ〉 =
r∑
i=1
√
λi|ai〉 ⊗ |bi〉 , (1)
where |ai〉 and |bi〉 are orthonormal eigenstates of ρA and ρB, respectively. In addition,
r ≤ min(p, q) is the total dimension of the non-zero eigenspaces of ρA. This representation
is called the Schmidt decomposition [25].
Proof: Any |Φ〉 can be written in terms of the orthonormal eigenbasis {|ai〉} of ρA as
|Φ〉 =
p∑
i=1
|ai〉 ⊗ |b′i〉 , (2)
where |b′i〉’s are not necessarily orthogonal. By taking a trace over HB, we find
TrB|Φ〉〈Φ| = TrB
p∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
|aj〉 ⊗ |b′j〉〈ai| ⊗ 〈b′i|
=
p∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
q∑
k=1
〈bˆk|b′j〉|aj〉〈ai|〈b′i|bˆk〉
=
p∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
q∑
k=1
〈b′i|bˆk〉〈bˆk|b′j〉|aj〉〈ai|
=
p∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
〈b′i|b′j〉|aj〉〈ai| , (3)
4The discussion in this Subsection is based on Ref. [25].
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where |bˆk〉’s form an orthonormal basis in HB. Equating this to
ρA =
r∑
i=1
λi|ai〉〈ai| (4)
gives 〈b′i|b′j〉 = λiδij . Hence, |bi〉 = λ−
1
2
i |b′i〉 is an orthonormal set in HB, and the Schmidt
decomposition in Eq. (1) holds.
Similarly, by taking the trace of |Φ〉 over HA, we arrive at
ρB =
r∑
i=1
λi|bi〉〈bi| . (5)
Therefore, |bi〉 is an eigenvector of ρB corresponding to the eigenvalue λi.
Q.E.D.
E. Alice’s cheating strategy
Now, we show that the two basic security requirements of quantum bit commitment are
inconsistent: In fact, if Bob cannot learn the value of the committed bit b, then Alice can
almost always cheat successfully by changing the value of b at the beginning of the opening
phase without being caught by Bob.
Consider the combined quantum state of the particles in Alice and Bob’s hand just before
the opening phase. We can include HC to the quantum machine of whoever controlling the
channel at this point. Therefore, H = HA⊗HB simply. When the committed bit, b, is zero,
the state of the composite system can be written in Schmidt decomposition (see Eq. (1)) as
|0final〉 =
∑
i
√
αi|ei〉A ⊗ |φi〉B . (6)
On the other hand, when the committed bit, b, is one, it can be written in Schmidt decom-
position as
|1final〉 =
∑
i
√
βi|e′i〉A ⊗ |φ′i〉B . (7)
The quantum state of Bob’s particles, without the extra information coming from Al-
ice, can be described by a density matrix obtained by taking a partial trace of the entire
wavefunction over the particles at Alice’s hand. If b = 0, Bob’s density matrix is
TrA(|0final〉〈0final|) ≡ ρB0 =
∑
i
αi|φi〉B〈φi|B . (8)
Similarly, if b = 1, Bob’s density matrix is
TrA(|1final〉〈1final|) ≡ ρB1 =
∑
i
βi|φ′i〉B〈φ′i|B . (9)
In order that Bob has little chance to know Alice’s choice in advance, we require the
reduced matrices TrA(|0final〉〈0final|) ≡ ρB0 and TrA(|1final〉〈1final|) ≡ ρB1 to be as “close” as
possible.
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Let us first consider the ideal case when ρB
0
= ρB
1
. It then follows5 from Eqs. (8) and (9)
that
αi = βi (10)
and
|φi〉B = |φ′i〉B . (11)
for all i. Substituting Eqs. (10) and (11) into Eq. (7), we get
|1final〉 =
∑
i
√
αi|e′i〉A ⊗ |φi〉B . (12)
Let us consider the unitary transformation UA which maps |ei〉A to |e′i〉A. Notice that it
is a local unitary transformation by Alice and as such can be implemented by Alice alone.
Remarkably, it maps |0final〉 to |1final〉. In other words, Alice can always cheat by changing
her bit from 0 to 1 just before she opens her commitment. More concretely, the cheating
strategy goes as follows: She always executes the protocol for b = 0 during the commitment
phase. At the beginning of the opening phase, she decides on the value of b that she would
like to open. Suppose she decides b = 0 now, she simply executes the protocol honestly. On
the other hand, if she now chooses b = 1, she applies UA to her state. This changes |0final〉 to
|1final〉. She can then declare that b = 1 and execute the opening phase for b = 1 accordingly.
There is absolutely no way for Bob to defeat such an attack by Alice.
Having considered the ideal case, let us now, following Mayers [18], consider the non-
ideal case where ρB0 differs from ρ
B
1 slightly. In quantum mechanics, a good measure of
the “closeness” between two density matrices is fidelity [24]. In general, given two reduced
density matrices ρB
0
and ρB
1
of Bob, there are many possible systems A attached to Bob’s
system B such that the combined wavefunction of systems A and B are pure states |Ψ0〉 and
|Ψ1〉, respectively. That is, TrA(|Ψi〉〈Ψi|) = ρBi for i = 0, 1. This kind of pure states |Ψi〉
are called purifications. The fidelity can be defined as
F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = max (|〈Ψ0|Ψ1〉|) , (13)
where the maximization is taken over all possible purifications. Clearly 0 ≤ F ≤ 1. More-
over, F = 1 if and only if there is a purification such that |Ψ0〉 = |Ψ1〉, which in turn holds if
and only if ρB
0
= ρB
1
. The closer the two reduced density matrices, the higher their fidelity.
Therefore, the requirement that Bob has little chance to know Alice’s choice in advance
implies that
F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
) = 1− δ (14)
for some small δ ≥ 0.
5Here we assume that the eigenstates are non-degenerate. The case of degenerate eigenstates can
be dealt with in a similar manner.
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Here come two simple but crucial remarks. First, for any fixed purification |Ψ1〉 of
ρB
1
, there exists a maximally parallel purification |Ψ0〉 of ρB0 such that Eq. (13) is satisfied.
Second, it can be proved that any two purifications |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ′0〉 of the same density matrix
ρB
0
are necessarily related by a local unitary transformation by Alice alone. These two facts
follow trivially from the form of Schmidt decomposition in Eq. (1).
Let us apply these two remarks to non-ideal quantum bit commitment. From the first
remark, given a purification |1final〉 of ρB1 in Eq. (7), there exists a purification |0′〉 of ρB0 such
that
〈0′|1final〉 = 1− δ . (15)
From the second remark, there exists a local unitary transformation say UA that maps |0final〉
to |0′〉.
Now it is clear that, using the same cheating strategy as in the ideal case, Alice can almost
always cheat successfully. In more detail, Alice’s cheating strategy goes as follows: Alice
chooses b = 0 and executes the commit phase honestly. During the opening phase, Alice
decides the value of b to be opened. If she chooses it to be 0, she acts honestly. However,
if she chooses it to be 1, she claims that b = 1 and applies the local unitary transformation
UA to change |0final〉 to |0′〉. From Eq. (15), it is very hard for Bob to distinguish the state
in the dishonest case, |0′〉, from the state in the honest case, |1final〉. Therefore, Alice can
almost always cheat successfully.
Notice that the cheating strategy makes essential use of entanglement. To succeed in
cheating, Alice must be able to store quantum signals for a long time and to coherently
manipulate quantum particles. That is, Alice generally needs a quantum computer.
At this moment, readers may ask why the no-cloning theorem and uncertainty principle
cannot prevent Alice from cheating. The reason is simple: It is impossible for Bob to verify
every unitary transformation and measurement that Alice has made. Therefore, Alice can
delay making her unitary transformation |0final〉 −→ |0′〉 till the opening phase.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A. Secure Computations
Quantum bit commitment is a basic building block for many other quantum crypto-
graphic protocols. After the fall of quantum bit commitment, the security of other quantum
two-party protocols, in particular, the so-called two-party secure computations also came
into question.
In a one-sided two-party secure computation, Alice with a secret x and Bob with a secret
y would like to cooperate to compute a prescribed function f(x, y) such that at the end,
(i) Alice learns nothing (about y and f(x, y)); (ii) Bob learns f(x, y); and (iii) Bob learns
nothing about x except for what logically follows from y and f(x, y).
One-sided two-party secure computations can, for instance, be used to prevent a fake
teller machine from stealing a customer’s PIN (Personal Identification Number): To do this,
let x be the customer’s (i.e., Alice’s) PIN , y be the record of the customer’s PIN in the teller
machine (i.e., Bob). Consider the function f(x, y) = δxy. Running the one-sided two-party
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computation of f(x, y) will allow the teller machine to verify whether the customer’s input
x matches the record y of the teller machine. However, a fake teller machine does not know
which y to use as the input. Using a random y will give it very little information about x.
The insecurity of quantum one-sided two-party secure computations was finally demon-
strated explicitly by one of us [23], who showed that a cheating Bob can learn f(x, y) for all
values of y. This is a fatal violation of the security requirement. For instance, in the above
password verification scheme such a cheating Bob will, by testing all possible values of y,
learn the customer’s input x.
A cheating Bob proceeds as follows: Bob inputs y = y1, executes the protocol honestly
and learns f(x, y1) by performing a measurement. He then applies a unitary transformation
to change the value of y from y1 to y2 and learns f(x, y2) by performing a measurement.
After that, he applies a unitary transformation to change the value of y from y2 to y3 to
learn f(x, y2) and so on.
This cheating strategy works chiefly for two reasons. First, the measurement of say
f(x, y1) in no way disturbs the state under observation. This is so because the state is an
eigenstate of f(x, y1).
6 Second, the essence of the insecurity of quantum bit commitment is
that if a party A knows nothing about the input b of another party B even at the end of the
protocol, then B can cheat by changing b at the very end. Now since in a one-sided two-
party secure computation Alice cannot learn about y, a cheating Bob can change the value
of y. That is, the state of all quantum particles in Alice and Bob’s hands when computing
f(x, y) and f(x, y′) are related by a unitary transformation involving only particles in Bob’s
hand [23], as required in the cheating strategy presented in the last paragraph.
In conclusion, quantum one-sided two-party secure computations are, in principle, inse-
cure.7 Even though quantum bit commitment and quantum two-party secure computations
are insecure in theory, they may still be secure in practice. This is because a cheater gener-
ally needs a quantum computer to cheat successfully. And it is a technological feat to build
a quantum computer. The implication is that, by working with quantum protocols, one may
replace classical computational assumptions with quantum computational assumptions.
B. Security Analysis of Composite Quantum Protocols
In the security analysis of quantum protocols, researchers usually only consider the case
when a protocol is executed only once and in isolation. This is, however, contrary to the
spirit that a cryptographic protocol satisfies conventional security requirements, which are
6This is because Bob is supposed to be able to determine f(x, y1) unambiguously. Here we are
considering the ideal case. The non-ideal case where the state is only approximately an eigenstate
of f(x, y1) does not change the essential argument [23].
7Another interesting protocol is quantum coin tossing, we have shown in Ref. [22] that ideal
quantum coin tossing (that completely forbids successful cheating) is impossible. It is still open
whether non-ideal coin tossing is achievable. It was also shown in Ref. [23] that quantum two-sided
two-party secure computations are also generally impossible.
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usually written in terms of probability and thus implicitly demand that protocols follow the
rules of inference in classical probability theory. Therefore, in analyzing quantum protocols
a more refined security analysis than what is commonly adopted is needed [23]. In order to
be able to apply classical probability theory to the study of a composite protocol, it is crucial
to study the security of quantum protocols not only when they are used in isolation, but also
when they are used as “black-box” primitives in building up more complicated protocols. It
is only when they pass such a stringent test that they should be certified as secure.
Of course, such security analysis may be difficult to perform in practice. However, this is
the price that one has to pay in asserting that a quantum scheme achieves a set of security
requirements which are written in terms of classical probability.8
With this more stringent and, in our opinion, more accurate security analysis, classical
inference is, by definition, valid. Since it is a standard result in classical cryptography that
some two-party secure computations can be used to implement bit commitment [9], the
impossibility of quantum bit commitment must immediately imply that quantum two-party
secure computation is generally impossible.
C. Lessons We Learn
We remark that the attacks used by Mayers in Refs. [18,20,21], by Lo and Chau in
Refs. [19,22] and by Lo in Ref. [23] as discussed in this paper, were not new. A weakness
of a restricted class of quantum secure computation schemes (“multiplexing channel” [12])
as well as the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-type of attack [7] which underlines the insecurity
of quantum bit commitment and secure computations had already been noted in some
pioneering papers. What had not been fully appreciated until the work of Mayers [18,20,21]
and ours [19,22,23] was the generality of such attacks.
Quantum mechanics is a double-edged sword in cryptology. While it apparently equips
cryptographers with secure schemes of quantum key distribution9 due to the quantum no-
cloning theorem, it also gives the quantum cryptanalyst the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen effect
which allows him to delay his measurement and defeat quantum bit commitment and se-
cure computations. Now on one hand, we generally believe that quantum key distribution
is secure. On the other hand, quantum bit commitment and one-sided two-party secure
computations have been shown to be impossible. A natural question to ask is: What is
the exact boundary to the power of quantum cryptography? For instance, does quantum
cryptography help multi-party secure computations? The answers to these questions may
give us new insights on quantum information theory.
We must emphasize that the security of quantum key distribution is unaffected by the
attacks described in this paper. Quantum key distribution alone should guarantee that
8The only alternative that we can think of is to describe the security requirements of quantum
cryptographic protocols in terms of probability amplitude. Such an alternative has not been given
serious consideration so far.
9Despite many interesting approaches proposed in the literature [27–33], in our opinion, a widely
accepted complete proof of the security of quantum cryptography in a noisy channel is still missing.
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quantum cryptography remains a fertile subject for future investigations. This is so par-
ticularly because of the dramatic recent progress in experimental quantum cryptography
[34–38].
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